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Feature Essay
Winter 2018
Fitzgerald, Michael W. Alabama’s Class Politics through the Civil War
Crisis—and its Echoes.
In an overview of the role of “poor whites” in Alabama’s political
development, and of the non-slaveholding majority of whites specifically, one
cannot define a simple pattern. But two broad factors structured Alabama’s
antebellum evolution. The first is the commitment to racial supremacy across all
classes within the white population. The other is the strength of an intermingled
regional and class resentment in the areas least dominated by slavery, commerce,
and cotton production. Both concerns were strong in Alabama, but they
interacted in complex ways, with a sharp disjuncture in the Civil War era. Both
aspects fueled Alabama’s central role in the later civil rights confrontations, and
the state’s subsequent emergence as a conservative Republican stronghold. Most
recently, the state’s “populistic” heritage encouraged the favorable response to
candidate and President Donald Trump.
The state’s geography largely determined these patterns. In the antebellum
era, there were two main regions characterized by cotton production and slavery.
The major one was the south central “black belt” which stretched across the
state, from Selma to Montgomery and beyond, a region dominated by
plantations. A secondary and older plantation region was in the extreme north of
the state, in the Tennessee valley surrounding Huntsville. The rest of the state,
particularly the mountain and piedmont areas of the north central region, and the
sparsely settled “wiregrass” counties of the southeast, were
numerically-dominated by white small farmers. (See appendix one.) The
shorthand version was of an aristocratic cotton belt counterpoised against the
democratic inclinations of the hill country, and of north Alabama in general.
Wealth was strikingly concentrated in the central plantation belt, the bulk of the
large slaveholdings being located there, while the whites in the non-plantation
regions numerically predominated. The consequence was that the large
plantation owners and urban elites couldn’t control the electorate, which
generated recurrent outbreaks of small-P populism. These features are perhaps
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the distinctive aspects of Alabama’s development, combined with a defiance of
outside sensibilities encouraged by the defense of slavery and racial hierarchy.
At statehood in 1819, a cluster of well-connected large planters in the
Tennessee Valley became the state’s founding fathers. Their initial dominance,
and their favoritism toward the Planters’ and Merchants’ Bank of Huntsville,
generated widespread resentment of the “Royal” faction. The beneficiary of this
sentiment was governor and land speculator Israel Pickens, the improbable first
tribune of the masses of the state’s later-settled areas. In the 1820s, Pickens
established a state bank to compete with the private banks, a policy which
proved wildly profitable. For several years, the state bank and its paper money
funded Alabama’s governmental operations, buoying the economy and providing
a utopian interlude of public spending with few taxes. It was nice while it lasted,
and it contributed to the overwhelming popularity of the emergent Democratic
majority—in 1828, Andrew Jackson won 90% of the state’s presidential vote, he
having personally wrested much of Alabama from the Creeks. But the panic of
1837 bankrupted the bank and absorbed the state’s large Federal educational
endowment with it. The responsibility for this disaster was mixed, and the
debates over the government’s role in banking sustained a lopsided two-party
system for decades.
After Native American removal, as white settlement proceeded, the
geographic pattern of the state’s politics stabilized. The anti-Jackson Whig party
became the vehicle of the rich black belt and Alabama’s few cities. Whigs
favored activist government to promote economic growth, and they warily
resonated with the national currents of Protestant reform. They favored
promoting banks, protective tariffs, and internal improvements, along with
public education and the university. As J. Mills Thornton argued, they were
vigorously opposed by the small farmers of the hill country, who disliked taxes
and government schemes to benefit well-connected elites. Farmers widely
resented the social pretentions of the slaveholding rich; they rallied to Jackson’s
war on the banks and monopolies, and to his unlettered and unbridled personal
style. This proved a winning political formula, given the mal-distribution of
wealth that slavery encouraged. Class and regional disparities fueled Democratic
majorities as the party of negative government, of localism and states’ rights.
Democrats controlled the state, carrying every statewide contest before the Civil
War. This let them impose tax policies that targeted slave property and favored
small farmers. Alabama’s privileged planters and merchants, at least the Whigs
among them, thus experienced the odd reality of being locked out of formal
2




Undergirding this political configuration was the state’s unity on issues of
race, both towards Native Americans and toward African-Americas. Indian
removal opened vast tracts to both white settlement. Slavery opened avenues of
upward mobility for some poorer whites, like overseers, who sometimes entered
the planter class. Also, the emphasis on serving black belt areas in transportation
and banking meant widespread property ownership of less productive land
elsewhere. Alabama’s limited antebellum industrial development also insured
that few whites worked for one another. Land remained cheap in the hills, with
grain for local use and livestock production predominating. Older values of study
independence long remained viable in this setting. Both parties defended racial
slavery as the basis of white liberty, and so long as the external threat looked
manageable, citizens could divide on class-related issues. But the growing
salience of slavery expansion after the Mexican War undermined the Whig
emphasis on economic development and its support for an active Federal
government. The Whigs went into decline in the 1850s, especially as their
former northern allies were drawn into an antislavery Republican party. But the
Democrats’ drift toward sectional extremism and secessionism eroded the
political system. They provided opponents occasional opportunities as
“conservative” friends of the Union.
Even as Civil War approached, economic policy issues and the symbolism
surrounding them remained important in state politics. The collapse of the
Whigs, and the cotton boom of the 1850s, encouraged some Democrats to
embrace economic modernization, and to favor public education and government
subsidies for railroad construction. This provoked a backwoods backlash in the
form of the “veto-governor” John Winston. He vetoed some thirty-odd railroad
and pro-development bills, reinvigorating the Democratic crusade against
monopolies and the rich. At decade’s end, modernizers again passed a statewide
general railroad aid bill, but the secession crisis prevented implementation. Here
too, we see the prevailing pattern of the antebellum era, planter elites and urban
modernizers could not impose an activist vision of government upon the state. In
Governor Winston’s electoral success, we again see Democratic leadership
mobilizing a popular following against the elites, with the external threat to the
racial order encouraging supercharged rhetoric on other issues.
Only the earthquake of secession could shake the partisan alignments that
insured a Democratic popular majority. Anti-elite rhetoric remained powerful,
3
Fitzgerald: Alabama's Class Politics Through The Civil War Crisis -- And Its
Published by LSU Digital Commons, 2018
but the crisis propelled that sentiment in diverse directions. In the crucial 1860
presidential elections, the disunited “conservative” following maintained some
strength, with the Whiggish moderate John Bell doing well in the black belt and
cities. The national Democrat Steven Douglas also gained 15% of the vote,
carrying several Tennessee Valley counties in a protest against the Democratic
drift toward disunion. Resistance to states’ rights extremism remained a
significant force, but the southern rights faction of Democrats backing John C.
Breckinridge won the state with 54% of the vote. They carried most of the
party’s northern Alabama strongholds, based on traditional loyalties, but the
vote’s immediate aftermath shook these patterns to the core.
The national election outcome shocked white Alabamians. Abraham
Lincoln’s victory as an antislavery Republican prompted alarm, with South
Carolina’s secession forcing a crisis. Most whites probably favored secession in
some form, but the issue opened divisions over tactics. In the December 1860
election to call a secession convention, the geographic patterns of decades
dissolved. South Alabama united behind immediate secession. That is to say, the
plantation areas long prone to Whiggish sectional moderation now went for
disunion. In north Alabama, though, the electorate instead backed a
“cooperationist” course, either cooperative secession or some ill-defined
Union-saving alternative. (See appendix two). In the most isolated reaches of the
hill country, cooperationist candidates won by large margins, indicating an
outright rejection of secession. Alabama’s subsequent secession, and the
outbreak of war, reconciled many former skeptics to the Confederate
government. Other anti-secessionists lapsed into sullen noncooperation with the
new regime.
During this crisis, one can still find little evidence of antislavery sentiment,
still less of antiracism, but dramatic events can push people in unpredictable
ways. The sense that poorer men were being railroaded by into a war by
secessionist fanatics was widespread, at least in northern Alabama. The
longstanding class grievances, and the localism of the hills, encouraged
defeatism or outright Unionism. Margaret Storey estimates that fifteen per cent
of white Alabamians backed the Union strongly. Belief or local situation
trumped class, per se, in determining individuals’ wartime loyalties, but
Unionism was strongest in the poorest reaches of northern Alabama. The
geography of the conflict heightened these sentiments, especially as the war
dragged on and demands by the Confederate government grew. The far northern
section was occupied early by Union forces, commencing years of raids and
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destruction. This meant that the region least enthusiastic about secession
experienced devastation, while the plantation belt long went nearly untouched.
Furthermore, draft evaders and deserters concentrated in the mountains, where
capture was difficult and local sentiment often provided protection and food.
Confederate measures to apprehend them drove many into outright Unionism,
with some three thousand white men joining the Federal army, and still others
resorted to brigandage. Outright Unionists’ reliance on outside aid pushed them
toward the Lincoln administration and its emancipation policy—that is to say,
toward apostasy on race and Federal supremacy. They numerically dominated
few counties, so when the southern soldiers finally returned home, open
anti-Confederates would be converted into an imperiled minority overnight.
Thus the “unconditional Unionists,” and their vulnerability to retaliation, made
many into Reconstruction “scalawags.” They sought a drastic restructuring of the
polity at Republican hands.
By war’s end, the outright Unionists were not alone. A large minority of
whites had abandoned an unpopular Confederate cause, and northern Alabama
was littered with self-proclaimed Unionists, with minute distinctions in the
secession crisis looming large. Even in the black belt, Whiggish “conservative”
sentiment reasserted itself as defeat became likely, with a faction seeking a
negotiated separate peace for Alabama. All these groups favored postwar
policies designed to keep the state’s Democratic and secessionist majority at bay,
and to keep the authors of a ruinous war from office. The hope was that Federal
power would encourage restraint, but as President Andrew Johnson’s
Reconstruction policies handed power into the hands of ex-Confederates, many
of these disparate dissidents looked to the Republican Congress and the army for
protection. As Congressional sentiment shifted toward enfranchising southern
freedmen as a solution, unconditional Unionists generally backed restoring the
state under the terms of the Military Reconstruction acts of 1867. (See appendix
three, for the pattern of white votes for Reconstruction). So too did some former
Whigs and conservatives who saw an opportunity to use the transition to
advantage, like Governor Robert M. Patton, who resurrected the long-stalled
railroad subsidy measures by collaborating with Congressional Reconstruction.
His hope was that swift restoration of the state to the Union would restore the
state’s credit, and thus enable subsidy measures. And so it proved, with fiscally
disastrous results. Here, then, is the class-drenched genesis of Radical
Reconstruction, and of its violent overthrow: a counterrevolution that would
influence the state’s racial politics through the civil rights movement and
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beyond.
Examining that process would take us too far afield here. We might simply
say that as the Civil War’s resentments cooled, white opinion reunified in
opposition to black demands for equality and Federal protection. They also
solidified against the Reconstruction government’s activist railroad policies, and
the state bankruptcy they engendered. The result was a fundamentalist
Democratic surge after the 1873 depression hit, under White Line slogans of
racial resentment. Redemption gave the reunited Democratic masses what they
desired, small government, low taxes, and white supremacy. The additional
consequence was that the Constitution of 1875 provided cotton belt elites a
reservoir of captive black votes and resulting legislative overrepresentation.
These were deployed thereafter as circumstances dictated, mostly to beat back
agrarian demands.
The ironic outcome was that restive farmers got what they wanted in
Redemption, but not what they needed. In an industrializing Alabama, with the
railroad infrastructure finally built and the Birmingham district booming,
negative government and low taxes served black belt planters and urban elites
better than it did white farmers. This fueled Greenbacker and Populist revolts in
the subsequent years. The resulting threat of insurgent, opportunistic biracial
electoral coalitions was only eliminated by constitutional disfranchisement in
1901. After that, for half a century and more, the political settlement insured that
lively white class politics occurred within the confines of a one-party state.
The relevance of Alabama’s early political development to this outcome
seems clear. From statehood on, interlocking patterns of class and region-based
white dissent motivated an anti-elite style of public discourse. The Civil War
disrupted the partisan expression of that sentiment, but not the inclination itself.
It kept returning in such apparently inconsistent forms as the Ku Klux Klan of
the 1920s and support for the New Deal in the subsequent decade. And so, to
jump to our time, the recent Senatorial special election results, and the strength
of Judge Roy Moore in the small towns and rural areas of northern Alabama, has
ample precedent. Moore may have lost, but President Trump himself benefitted
from this tradition of popular defiance of polite sentiment—even if now often
directed at the Establishment of his own Republican party.
Michael W. Fitzgerald is a professor of history at St. Olaf College and 
author of several books. His latest book is Reconstruction in Alabama: From
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Civil War to Redemption in the Cotton South (2017).
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